Book Survey by Murphy, Edward J.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 37 | Issue 3 Article 12
3-1-1962
Book Survey
Edward J. Murphy
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward J. Murphy, Book Survey, 37 Notre Dame L. Rev. 465 (1962).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol37/iss3/12
BOOK SURVEY
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (3 ed., 4 Vols.) Revision by Walter H. E. Jaeger.
Mt. Kisco, N.Y.: Baker, Voorhis & Co., Inc., 1957-1961. Pp. xxii, 826-I; xv,
1095-I; xii, 931-11; ix, 1167-IV. The legal treatise has been enormously influ-
ential in the development of Anglo-American law. Paradoxically, the effect has
been both to encourage and to limit stare decisis. The summarization and classifica-
tion of the precedents has helped to provide the courts with ready access to the
past, and this has tended to promote adherence to what was previously decided.
On the other hand, the commentary or gloss upon the case 'has frequently been
more important than the actual decision in the determination of future contro-
versies and, of course, in the framing of legislation. That this should be true is
neither surprising nor undesirable, for as one of the greats succinctly put it:
"Every institute and principle of law has a philosophy-as every object in the
sunlight has its attendant shadow. In the question for the rule we must insist on
including its reasons, and on lifting them out into the open... . [W]e must be
students of reasons as well as of rules."' If, as implied, the proper measure of
law is its conformity to standards of reason, then the reflections and analyses of
the commentators are indispensable. For it is to them, rather than to the courts,
that we regularly must turn for an articulation of "reasons," both pro and con
the prevailing view.
Perhaps the most significant contributions have been made by individual
writers who undertook to explore and systematize an entire subject or area of
the law. And of these no one has had more influence or been held in higher
esteem than Professor Samuel Williston, who last September 24 completed his
hundredth year. His monumental treatise on contracts, published originally in
1920 and revised in 1936-38, was for years the unchallenged authority on general
contractual matters and still exerts a powerful influence. A new revision of Willis-
ton on Contracts is therefore a noteworthy event, the more so since the work is in
the capable hands of Professor Walter H. E. Jaeger.2
The magnitude of Professor Jaeger's undertaking staggers the imagination.
In recounting his work on the second edition, done in collaboration with Professor
George Thompson, Professor Williston wrote as follows in his autobiography:
"Professor Thompson was determined that the work should be done in the most
thorough manner and was tireless in his efforts. I too was kept busy, for I wrote
some chapters entirely and the revision of the text of the remainder of the work
was no slight task. The volumes were published separately and both of us felt a
great load lifted from our shoulders in 1938 when the last of the eight large volumes
issued from the press. The eighth volume consisted entirely of an elaborate index
and an alphabetical table of the 70,000 cases, cited in other volumes. When it is
added that many of -these cases were cited several times in different connections
some idea may be 'had of the labor involved in preparing a comprehensive law
book at -the present time. My imagination is appalled at the thought of what the
difficulty will be in another generation." 3 Should Professor Jaeger write his auto-
biography, he will doubtless supply verification. To begin with, the new revision,
four volumes of which have appeared to date, will probably run to at least twelve
volumes. New developments alone during the intervening quarter century make
this extension inevitable. Additionally, there has been considerable revision of
the old text, buttressed by numerous references to the periodical literature.
Compared to most contemporary authors, Professor Williston was restrained
in his criticism of existing law, and in the treatise -his primary purpose was to give
1 WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAWS OF TORTS, viii (1911).
2 A long-time teacher at Georgetown, Professor Jaeger has written extensively on
contracts and related subjects.
3 WrLniSTON, LiFE AND LAW 266-67 (1940).
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a full report rather than critically evaluate, let alone urge reformation. Significantly,
in the preface to the first edition he deemed it appropriate to state that he "made
no apology for devoting some space to legal analysis and criticism." His jurispru-
dential method, no longer in vogue, was such that he appeared to accept, on faith,
as it were, the basic doctrines and proceeded to emphasize "logic" (deduction
from or analogy to judicial authorities) and only rarely would appraise a premise
or a conclusion in terms of "policy." 4 This is not to say he deigned to suggest
improvements. As principal author of the Restatement of Contracts, which despite
its title was largely normative in character, and also of several uniform acts, Profes-
sor Williston was second to none in the law improvement department. Yet the
thrust of the treatise was strongly in the direction of organizing and stating the
is, with comparatively few assertions of the ought. Similarly, Professor Jaeger's
restraint insures that the work will remain, in all essentials, Williston in both
approach and content. Policy is still rather sparingly considered. Therein, to my
mind, lies both the strength and the weakness of the final product. As an encyclo-
pedia of contract law, it is outstanding. The treatment is comprehensive and
exhaustive. Moreover, there need be no fear that the revisor is distorting the
picture by the injection of his own 'beliefs or preferences. Most certainly the
treatise will continue to be, as it has in the past, a trusted reference work for the
bench and bar. But the user must not expect from the text that which it does
not purport to supply. One can learn the message, but for additional assistance
in appraising it (and predicting its durability) must press on to other materials.
Today with ever-increasing frequency, policy considerations, drawn largely from
extra-legal sources, loom large in the shaping of legal doctrine, particularly that
which emanates from legislative bodies. For this reason, some portions of the
text may become dated rather quickly, and the pocket part supplements called
upon for extra duty. I suggest below one such possibility.
Over fifty pages of the first volume are devoted to the matter of definiteness
as a requisite of contract. A leitmotif of the common law decisions on definiteness
is the recurring statement 'that the "courts will not make a contract for the
parties." There has been, in general, a marked disinclination to fill any gaps or
resolve ambiguities by the enforcement of some judicially approved standard
(reasonable price, etc.) and thus save the agreement. Similarly, despite evident
intention to be bound, so-called "agreements to agree" have with but few excep-
tions been held to be unenforceable. The exhaustive text treatment amply supports
these generalities, with what possibly may be the citation of every pertinent case.
However, there have for some -time been solid indications that a basic change of
attitude is in the making, and the possibility and implications of this should be
examined. It has often been argued that the traditional attitude is at variance
with commercial expectations and inadequate to satisfy legitimate commercial
needs. Adverse business effects have, in part, been mitigated through the utilization
of types of "escalator clauses." Thus, rent is geared -to gross receipts, wage scales
to a cost of living index, price to specified market quotations, etc. Most significantly,
the Uniform Commercial Code, decidedly a policy oriented statute, breaks decisively
with the older position. Section 2-204(3), which states the principle as to "open
term" agreements underlying other sections, provides as follows: "Even though
one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness
if the parties have intended to make a contract and -there is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy."5 This is a sweeping provision, amplified
by the following official comment: "The test is not certainty as to what the
parties were to do nor as to the exact amount of damages due the plaintiff. Nor
is the fact that one or more terms are left to be agreed upon enough of itself to
defeat an otherwise adequate agreement. Rather, commercial standards on the
4 See Professor Fuller's incisive review of the second edition. 18 N. C. L.REv. 1 (1939).
5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-204(3).
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point of 'indefiniteness' are intended to be applied, this Act making provision else-
where for missing terms needed for performance, open price, remedies and the
like.' 8 The important "open price" section is 2-305, subsections 1 and 2 of which
provide: "(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale
even though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price
at the time for delivery if (a) nothing is said as to price, or (b) the price is left
to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree, or (c) the price is -to be fixed
in terms of some agreed market or other standard as set or recorded by a third
person or agency and it is not so recorded. (2) A price to be fixed by the seller
or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith."7
There is no discussion in the text of the changes that will thus be ushered in
by adoption of the Code or'of the thinking which prompted them." Moreover,
there is no speculation as to the possible impact of these provisions in analogous
transactions. Consider, for example, Ablett v. Clauson, a rather typical case of
"agreement to agree," which after a snag in the District Court of Appeals,9
received the typical treatment from the California Supreme Court.10 A five-year
written lease provided that the lessees "shall have the first right and a prior option
to secure a lease upon said premises before the same are offered to any other person,
firm or corporation for lease or rental and that said option shall contemplate a
lease for a period of five (5) years upon terms to be then agreed upon." The
intermediate appellate court, in supporting the lessee's right to a renewal, observed:
"If, perchance, the parties do not agree on the rental or other provisions for the
new lease, the court itself will fix them in consonance with the spirit and language
of the agreement for a renewal despite the plea that the court is making a contract
in contravention of its power."'1 The Supreme Court promptly reversed. Would
the result be different under the Code? The short answer is that the Code, strictly
speaking has no relevancy, goods not being involved. But would not a lessee's
counsel have a potent argument for proposing a change, in view of the marked
change in attitude, albeit under statutory compulsion, in the sale of goods area?
Would not liberalization in the one area tend to beget liberalization in the other?
In the same way, consider the common. situation where an attempted description
fails because of "indefiniteness." Assume an agreement between a former employee
and an employer. The employee having been injured on the job and no longer
able to perform his old duties, the employer, for a sufficient consideration, promises
to give him "light work"' 2 or a "light job."" How much longer can we expect
courts to reject the employee's suit out of hand on the grounds of indefiniteness?
Why should not a court attempt to frame a solution which is believed fair to both
parties and thereby save the agreement? Would it really be an infringement of
freedom of contract for the court to examine the plant structure and other cir-
cumstances and then indicate the type of positioli which, in context, the expression
"light work" encompasses? Will not the Code help force at least a reappraisal
of similar decisions? It takes no crystal ball, in my opinion, to foresee a trend
6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-204, comment.
7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-305.
8 At the time these sections of the text were revised (c. 1956), the prospects of the
Uniform Commercial Code were not particularly bright. While it had been widely discussed
only Pennsylvania had adopted it. To some it appeared that the New York Law Revision
Commission's "rejection," in 1956, was the coup de grhce. But all that has changed. Massa-
chusetts adopted the Code in 1957, and has been followed by Kentucky, Connecticut, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Wyoming, Arkansas, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Oklahoma,
Illinois and New Jersey, with other adoptions in the near future virtually assured.
9 263 P.2d 333 (1953).
10 43 Cal.2d 280, 272 P.2d 753 (1954).
11 Supra, note 9, at 337.
12 Cf. Laseter v. Pet Dairy Products Co., 246 F.2d. 747 (4th cir., 1957).
13 Cf. Bonnevier v. Dairy Cooperative Association, 361 P.2d 262 (Ore., 1961).
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toward greater judicial enforcement of many heretofore "vague and indefinite"
promises. Similarly, may we not expect the number of so-called "illusory promises"
to decline sharply, since the Code imposes a fundamental obligation upon all
parties to act in good faith?1 4
In his preface to the first edition Professor Williston announced his intention
to "treat the subject of contracts as a whole, and to show the wide range of
application of its principles." He did this and did it well. Professor Jaeger has
striven to continue in the Williston tradition, hoping that the treatise will be "a
compact library on the ever-expanding range of subjects involving contractual
relations." He is well on the way to attaining his goal. We who are the third party
beneficiaries of their prodiguous efforts should be grateful.
Edward 1. Murphy*
14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203. Good faith for a merchant includes observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-103(1) (b).
* B.S., LL.B., Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
